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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
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ALL PUBLIC WORK BY STATUTE,
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I.

CONSTITUTIONALITY.
(a) Expressions of courts on.
(b) Grounds on which upheld.

(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
II.
III.

Due process clause.
Equal protection of the law.
Freedom of contract.
As against special assessments.

PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION.
POWER TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS.

(a) By statute.
(b) By ordinance.
(c) By contract.
IV.

APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS.

(a) Extent.
(b) When applicable.
(c) Where larger part of work is done in factory.
V.

RIGHTS INVOLVED.

(a) Of employer and employee.
(b) Waiver of.
VI.

INTERPRETATIONS.

(a) Eight-hour clause.
(b) Prevailing wage.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

MANNER OF ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
PENALTIES WHICH MAY BE IMPOSED.
CONTRARY CASES DISTINGUISHED AND EXPLAINED.

I
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The great weight of authority in this country is to the effect
that a statute, ordinance or contract limiting the number of hours
of labor in any one day and providing for a minimum wage scale on
all public work, violates no provision of the federal or state constitutions.
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The question of whether it is violative of any provision of the
federal constitution was settled forever by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Atkin vs. Kansas, wherein the court
decreed that it was purely a question of public policy to be determined by the legislative bodies and of which the court has no
concern.
Since the Atkin's case, courts throughout the country have, with
but a few exceptions, decided that the action of the Supreme Court
of the country in that case has forever foreclosed argument on
the question, and have followed the decision without discussion.
Through the enactment of chapter 391, Laws of I909, and
chapter 17i, Laws of 1911, known as section i729m of the statute
of 1915, the state has determined that except in cases of extraordinary emergency, all public work of the state "which may involve
the employment of laborers, workmen or mechanics" shall be done
on an 8 hour day basis and provides for a penalty for any officer,
contractor or sub-contractor who violates the provisions thereof.
This enactment represents the public policy of the state. Its
legality has never been challenged and cannot be questioned, in
view of the many decisions upholding similar legislation in other
jurisdictions.
The city of Milwaukee has an ordinance which provides for
an 8-hour day and a minimum wage for unskilled laborers and the
"prevailing rate of wages" for unskilled laborers on public work.
The "8-hour" feature was upheld in Raulf vs. Milwaukee, 164
Wis. 172.
The following extracts from numerous cases show the attitude
of the strongest courts in the country on the question:
(a) Expressions of courts on.
"Its constitutionality is beyond all question."
State (Okla.), io2 Pac. 8o4.

Byars vs.

"It violates no provision of the federal or state constitution." Penn. Bridge Co. vs. U. S., 29 App. D. C. 452.
"We believe that the contention of counsel for the defendant (that the 8 hour minimum wage law is unconstitutional) is without merit, and is unsupported by reason or
authority." Byars vs. State, supra.
"The right of the state or municipality to prescribe 8 hours
as a day's work and to require that the current rate of wages
be paid upon public work is not open to question." Norris
vs. City of Lawton (Okla.), 148 Pac. 123.
Is
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"The city has the absolute control of its own property
and can regulate the hours of work to be employed on the
same." State vs. McNally, 48 La. Ann. 1450, 21 So. 27.
"The ordinance violates no law so far as it designates the
number of hours in which laborers may be employed on
public works." Id.
"That the legislature may fix the hours of labor upon
public works and for public work even in cities is now well
settled, and no allusion to sustaining authority will be made."
Malette vs. Spokane, 68 Wash. 578, 123 Pac. Ioo5; Ann.
Cas. 1913E, p. 986.
"This proposition (right to prescribe these conditions) is
so elementary that a citation of authorities is unnecessary."
Byars vs. State, supra.
"It is a proper exercise of power."
47 L. R. A. 380.

Re Dalton (Kans.),

"We regard discussion of the question * * *as
foreclosed by the decision of the United States supreme court
in Atkin vs. Kansas." leople vs. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131.
"The power to prescribe the conditions upon which public
work shall be carried on is undoubtedly primarily in the
state." Milwaukee vs. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172.
"A provision in a contract to perform public work that
the contractor pay laborers not less than 25 cents an hour is
not violative of any constitutional or statutory provision."
Norris vs. Lawton (Okla.), 148 Pac. 123.
"It is a valid exercise of the police powers." State vs.
Livingston Concrete Bldg. & Mfg. Co. (Mont.), 87 Pac. 98o.
(b) Grounds on which upheld.
Following the Atkin's case, the courts in this country have
generally upheld the proposed provisions on the ground that they
are questions of public policy and therefore not reviewable by the
courts. A few courts have upheld similar legislation as a proper
exercise of police powers but this theory has been rejected in most
jurisdictions where they regard it purely as a question of contract
between the state or city and the contractor wherein the contractor
agrees to do the work with full knowledge of all provisions.
The grounds upon which the various courts upheld the legislation follow:
"* * * It can only be regarded as a direction by a
principal to his agent, and therefore as a matter of considera-
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tion to the principal and agent only."
(Okla.), io2 Pac. 8o4.

Byars vs. State

"The position which the state has taken nowise differs
from that of an individual who, in the employment of labor
refuses to permit his employees to labor more than eight
hours." In re Dalton, 61 Kans. 257; 59 Pac. 336; 47 L. R.
A. 380.
"If the state itself prosecutes the work, it may dictate
every detail of the services required in its performance; prescribe the wages of the workmen, their hours of labor, and
the particular individuals who may be employed. * * *
The state in this respect stands the same as its citizens. Its
rights are just as great as those of private citizens and no
greater." People vs. Orange Co. Road Constr. Co., 175 N.

Y.84.
In Ellis vs. U. S., 2o6 U. S. 246, the court held that the right
to limit the hours of labor on public work was an incident to the
powers of congress to authorize and enforce contracts for public
works. The court also held that a law otherwise valid would not
be made unconstitutional by the fact that it secured certain advantages to labor, though Congress did not have general control
over labor conditions.
"The city has the absolute control of its own property,
and can regulate the hours of work to be employed on the
same. The ordinance violates no law so far as it designates
the number of hours in which laborers may be employed on
public work." State vs. McNally (La.), 36 L. R. A. 533;
21 So. 27.

"We regard the statute chiefly as in the nature of a direction from a principal to his agent that eight hours is deemed
to be a proper length of time for a day's labor, and that his
contracts shall be based upon that theory. It is a matter
between the principal and his agent, in which a third party
has no interest."
U. S. vs. Martin,94 U. S..4oo; 24 L. ed 128 (in which an act of
congress was upheld declaring 8 hours shall constitute a day's work
for laborers, workmen or mechanics employed by or on behalf of
the government of the United States).
The Atkin's case was also followed in State vs. Lizingston Concrete Bldg. & Mfg. Co. (Mont.), 87 Pac. 98o, where it was held to
be a valid exercise of the police powers.
,53
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"The right by virtue of which the state regulates the use
of its property is not only one of dominion and sovereignty.
It is also the same in quality and character as the right of
the person with whom it contracts, and, when the state engages directly or indirectly in the construction of public improvements, it may employ and refuse employment to whom
it will, the same way and to the same extent that any citizen
may exercise this right in reference to his private and personal affairs. The right is the same in either case. This
proposition is so elementary that a citation of authoritiesis
unnecessary." Byars vs. State (Okla.), 1O2 Pac. 804.
"In the conflict of authority on the subject, the supreme
court of the United States having decided the precise question in upholding the Kansas law in the Atkin case, supra,
we shall conform to our usual custom by following the lead
of that august tribunal in determining the case at bar."
Keefe vs. People (Colo.), 87 Pac. 791.
"We agree with counsel that this statute, if valid, is so
upon the ground that the state, in its proprietary capacity,
may properly prescribe for itself and its auxiliary arms of
government the terms and conditions upon which work of a
public character may be done. (Upholding 8-hour provision.)" Id.
In speaking of the right of contract involved and the question
of personal liberty involved in this class of legislation the federal
supreme court said in Atkins vs. Kansas.
"It cannot be deemed a part of the liberty of any contractor that he be allowed to do public work in any mode
he may choose to adopt without regard to the wishes of the
state. On the contrary, it belongs to the state, as the
guardian and trustee of its people, and having control of its
affairs to PRESCRIBE the conditions upon which it will
permit public work to be done in its behalf, or on behalf of
its municipalities. No court has authority to review its
action in that respect. Regulations of this character suggest
only considerations of public policy, and with such considerations the courts have no concern."
Speaking of the right of laborers to contract their labor at any
price they may deem fit, the court in the same case said:
"If it be contended to be the right of everyone to dispose
of his labor upon such terms as he deems best, as undoubtedly
it is, and that to make it a criminal offense for a contractor
for public work to permit or require his employee to per-
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form labor upon that work in excess of eight hours each
day is in derogatioi of the liberty of both of employees and
employer, it is sufficient to answer that no employee is entitled, of absolute right and as part of his liberty, to perform
labor for the state; and no contractor for public work can
excuse a violation of his agreement with the state by doing
that which the statute under which he proceeds distinctly
and lawfully forbids him to do."
This decision was cited with approval in the somewhat analogous case of Ellis vs. U. S., 2o6 U. S. 255.
"The position which the state has taken in no wise differs
from that of an individual who, in the employment of labor,
refuses to permit his employees to labor more than eight
hours. It is certainly lawful for one to refuse to employ
men to work more than a given number of hours per day."
Re Dalton (Kans.), 47 L. R. A. 38o.
"We think that the city, in the performance of its public
duty of paving its streets, had a right to prescribe as one of
the terms upon which the contract should be let and the work
performed that the current rate of wages then prevailing
in the city should be paid to the laborers performing the
work upon said streets." Norris vs. Lawton (Okla.), 148
Pac. 123.

(c) Due process clause.
It is not in conflict with the 14th amendment of the Federal
Constitution as to taking property without due process of law.
Milwaukee vs. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172; Atkits vs. Kansas,
191 U. S.207,48 L. ed. 148, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. I24; Keefe vs.
People, 37 Colo. 317, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 131, 87 Pac. 791;

Re Broad, 36 Wash. 449, 70 L. R. A. ioii, 78 Pac. oo4,
2 A. &E. Ann. Cas. 212; State vs. Livingston Concrete Bldg.

& Mfg. Co., 34 Mont. 570, 87 Pac. 980, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas.
204; Jacobsonvs. Massachusetts,197 U. S. 11-31, 49 L. ed.
643-6.52, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 765;
Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S. 45-55, 49 L. ed. 937-941,
25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1133; California

Reduction Co. vs. Sanitary Reduction Works, I99 U. S.3o6,
319, So L. ed. 204, 210, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. Ioo; Moeschen vs.

Tenement House Dept., 2o3 U. S. 583, 5P L. ed. 328, 27
Sup. Ct.Rep. 781 ; Ellis vs. United States, 2o6 U. S.246,255,
15S
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51 L. ed. xo47, 1052, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6oo, ii A. & E. Ann.
Cas. 589; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412-421, 52 L. ed.
551-556, 28"SUp. Ct. Rep. 324, 13 A. & E. Ann Cas. 957.
(d) Equal protection of the law.
It does not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.
Milwaukee vs. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172; Williams vs. People,
N. Y. 4o5; People vs. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 195,31 L. R. A.
689, 52 Am. St. Rep. 7o7, 43 N. E. 541; Tenement House
Dept. vs. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 70 L. R. A. 7o4, io3
Am. St. Rep. 91o, 72 N. E. 231, I A. & E. Ann. Cas. 439,
affirmed in 203 U. S. 583, 51 L. ed. 328, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep.
781; People ex rel. Armstrong vs. Warden, 183 N. Y. 223,
2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 859, 76 N. E. II, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 325;
Re Morgan, 114 App. Div. 45, 99 N. Y. Supp. 775; Missouri
vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis), 101 U. S. 23-30, 25 L. ed.
989-992; Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 3, 28 L. ed.
923, 924, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Hayes vs. Missouri,i2O U. S.
68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350; Mallett vs. North
Carolina,I8I U. S. 589, 45 L. ed. 1015, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730.
24

Classification is not arbitrary or capricious so as to support a
claim that it denied equal protection of the laws because all in the
same class were not treated alike.
State ex rel. Williams, etc., Co. vs. Metz, supra.
"We regard discussion of the question involving discrimination between persons employed by private individuals and
those employed by municipal corporations as foresclosed by
the decision of the United States supreme court in Atkin vs.
Kansas." People vs. Williams, etc., supra.
(e) Freedom of contract.
The freedom of contract guaranteed by the United States Constitution, I4th Amendment, is not infringed by a statute making
it a criminal offense for a contractor on public work to permit or
require an employee to perform labor upon a public work in excess of eight hours per day.
State vs. Atkins, 64 Kans. 174, 97 A:S. R. 343, 67 Pac. 519.
Affirmed in 191 U. S. 207.
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This decision was held binding in Re Broad, 36 Wash. 449, 70
L. R. A. ion, where an ordinance fixing a minimum wage and an
8-hour day on public work was declared not to interfere with the

constitutional guaranty of liberty and property on the ground that
the public has the right to do its work in any manner it sees fit

and to compel those with whom it contracts to perform the work
in the same manner.

"It does not restrict or interfere with the right or liberty
of the employer or employee to contract." Byars vs. State
(Okla.), IO2 Pac. 8o4.
In People ex rel. Williams Engineering & C. Co. vs. Metz
(N. Y.), 85 N. E. Io7o, the court, in speaking of this question said:
"We close his branch of the discussion by quoting from
the latest utterance upon the subject by the court of last
resort upon Federal questions to which our attention has
been called: 'It is undoubtedly true, as more than once dedared by this court, that the general right to contract in relation to one's business is part of the liberty of the individual,
protected by the i 4 th amendment to the Federal constitution; yet it is equally well settled that this liberty is not
absolute and extending to all contracts, and that the state
may, without conflicting with the provisions of the 14th
Amendment, restrict, in many respects the individual's power
to contract."' Mueller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412.
(f) Special assessments.
The question of the validity of such legislation as against special
assessments has been the stumbling block in a few of the states.
The question was solved in the state of Washington when the
courts held that the only question involved as against special
assessments was one of reasonableness of the wage. This is a
question of fact. Surely no court would hold that a $2 a day
wage for a common laborer would be excessive. And it would
not be unreasonable even against special assessments to insist
that the prevailing or current wage be paid.
"Laws fixing the hours of labor and providing that no
less than the GOING rate of wages shall be paid under
contracts such as we have before us have been generally upheld; but the question for us to decide is whether, as against
a protesting property owner, a wage unreasonably higher
than the going wage can be arbitrarily paid for work done
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under a special assessment."
1005.

Malette vs. Spokane,

123

Pac.

In holding that a wage unreasonably higher than the going
wage could not be paid for such work, the court said:
"In disbursing funds so collected (by special assessments)
a city council is bound to act for the best interests of those
contributing to the fund. The city acts in its proprietary
capacity. Its council is the agent of the property owner."
Malette vs. Spokane, 123 Pac. 1005.
"The opening, construction, and maintenance of public
highways is purely a governmental function, whether done
by the state directly or by one of its municipalities, for which
the state is primarily liable, and it is immaterial whether such
public work is paid for by the state or by the city or BY THE
BENEFITED PROPERTY OWNER. It is a work of a
public, not private character. THE MANNER OF PAYMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF
THE WORK." Byars vs. State (Okla.), i2 Pac. 8o4.
II

PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION
"The manifest purpose of this provision is to promote the
industrial welfare of the people by fixing a high standard
for employes on public work." Byars vs. State (Okla.), io2
Pac. 8o4.
"It is a human life, health and welfare statute to be given
a beneficial interpretation for the public good." State ex rel.
vs. Ottawa (Kans.), 113 Pac. 391.
"The purpose of the statute is to conserve the health and
promote the happiness of the workingman." State vs. Livingston Concrete Bldg. & Mfg. Co., 87 Pac. 98o.
III

POWER TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS
(a) By statute.
* * the legislature, acting as the representative of
the commonwealth and its governmental subdivisions, may
determine as employer the number of hours which shall constitute a day's labor for all those with whom it makes contracts of employment. * * * There have been numerous
decisions to the effect that such laws are unconstitutional.
158
"*
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But we are not inclined to follow them so far as they are
inconsistent with the conclusion we have reached." Woods
vs. City of Woburn (Mass.), 107 N. E. 985.
"That the legislature may fix the hours of labor upon
public works and for public work even in cities is now well
settled, and no allusion to sustaining authority will be made."
Malette vs. Spokane, 123 Pac. ioo5.
"Oklahoma as a sovereign state is no less free as a party
to contract than any person in the state and the lawmaking
power has the right to provide that contracts made by the
state or any agent of the state shall be executed in conformity
with the requirements of the constitution and the statute."
Byars vs. State (qkla.), 102 Pac. 804.
As to right of legislature to fix by statute compensation which
city must pay for labor and other service, see People vs. Coler
(N. Y.), 52 L. R. A. 814.
As to constitutionality of 8-hour law as affecting municipal
corporations, see Re Dalton (Kans.), 47 L. R. A. 380, and Cleveland vs. Clements Bros. Constr. Co., 59 L. R. A. 775.
As to power of legislature to impose burdens on municipalities,
and to control their local administration and property see note to
State ex rel. Bulkeley vs. Williams (Conn.), 48 L. R. A. 465.
As to statutory limitation of hours of labor see:
People vs. Phyfe (N. Y.), i9 L. R. A. I41 and note; State
vs. Loomis (Mo.), 21 L. R. A. note on p. 796; Low vs. Rees
Printing Co. (Nebr.), 24 L. R. A. 702; Ritche vs. People
(IL.), 29 L. R. A. 79; State vs. McNally (La.), 36 L. R. A.
533; Holden vs. Hardy (Utah), 37 L. R. A. 103; Affirmed
in 42 L. ed. U. S 780; State vs. Holden (Utah), 37 L. R. A.
io8; Short vs. Bullion B. & C. Min. Co. (Utah), 45
L. R. A. 603; Re Morgan (Colo.), 47 L. R. A. 52.
(b) By ordinance.
"The city has the absolute control of its own property and
can regulate the hours of work to be employed on the same."
(This was done by ordinance which is set out in full.)
Louisiana vs. John McNally, 36 L. R. A. 533.
"The ordinance violates no law so far as it designates the
number of hours in which laborers may be employed on
public works." Id.
"* * * and the right of the state or municipality to
prescribe eight hours as a day's work and to require that
,59
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the current rate of wages be paid upon public work is not
open to question." Norris vs. City of Lawton (Okla.), 148
Pac. 123.
Milwaukee vs. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172.
The city has a right to pass an ordinance regulating the hours
of public works.
State vs. McNally, 48 La. Ann. 1450, 36 L. R. A. 534, 21
So. 27; Re Dalton, 61 Kans. 257, 47 L. R. A. 380, 59 Pac.
336; State vs. Atkin, 64 Kans. 174, 97 Am. St. Rep. 343,
67 Pac. 519; People ex rel. Warren vs. Beck, 3o N. Y. Supp.
473; People vs. Warren, 28 N. Y. Supp. 303.
(c) By contract.
"If then the state may do this by statute, or the city may
do this by ordinance, there cannot be any valid reason why
the same may not be done by contract." Norris vs. City of
Lawton (Okla.), 148 Pac. 123.
IV
APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS
(a) Extent of application.
In State vs. Ottawa, 84 Kans. 100, 113 Pac. 391, it was held that
the law applies to engineers and to all laborers, workmen or
mechanics or other persons employed to operate an electric light
and water plant of a city. It was there said:
"The determination of the amount of time during which
an employee works is not to be governed by the amount of
time consumed in the actual use of the hands but includes
also the time used in supervision, manipulation of machinery
however slight, and general oversight."
(b) When applicable.
"It has been decided by other courts that such a statute
was not intended to apply where the employment was not
by the day but by the hour, week, month or year." Luske vs.
Hotchkiss, 37 Conn. 219; Schurr vs. Savigny, 85 Mich.
'144, 48 N. W. 547.
It has been held in New York State that if a laborer, workman
or mechanic is employed on a per diem basis, he must be paid the
prevailing rate of wages, but if he is employed by the year at an
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annual salary which he receives irrespective of the number of days
he actually works, then the provisions of the labor law as to the
rate of compensation do not apply and there is nothing which
requires that the annual salary shall be fixed at a sum which divided by the number of working days in the year will give an
amount per day equal to the prevailing, or any other rate.
In Bock vs. City of New York, 31 Misc. 55, it was said:
"The Acts of 1894 and I897 (Labor Law, sec. 3) apply
only to mechanics employed in the usual way to do laboring
work, and, not to an appointee, like the plaintiff, holding
under a yearly employment at a fixed salary and furnished
with board and lodging without charge by the municipality.
A person situated as the plaintiff was is not brought into
competition with skilled painters, seeking daily or weekly
employment, so that he is clearly not within the reason or
purpose of the law, which, in consequence, does not apply."
In People ex rel. Sweeny vs. Sturgis, 78 App. Div. 46o, page
463, it was said:
"The word 'hire' evidently does not relate to public officers
or others holding positions under the city, who are included
in the classified lists of the Civil Service Law, such as the
uniformed members of the fire department who are appointed
to a position after a rigid examination and from competitive
lists. No contract of hiring is made with them. They receive annual salaries, not wages, either in the common or
legal acceptation of the term."
In Farrell vs. Board of Education, 113 App. Div. 405, 4o6, it
is said:
"The language of the Labor Law indicates that it refers
to those who are paid daily wages for labor upon public
works."
(c) Where the larger part of the work is done in the factory,
etc.
In the case of Ewen vs. Thompson-Starrett Co., 208 N. Y.
245, the court held that the prevailing rate of wages means the rate
in the locality where the work is done. In that case stone for a
municipal building in New York was quarried, cut, dressed and
trimmed in Maine and the workmen were paid the rate prevailing
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York City, but the court held that the wages paid according to
the rate prevailing in Maine governed as the workmen were not
employed "on, about or upon" the public work of constructing
the municipal building in the City of New York within the intent
of the law.
In the report of the Attorney General for New York State
given in I909, it was said:
"The phrase 'sub-contractor or other person doing or contracting to do the whole or a part of the work' does not
include a manufacturer entering into an agreement with a
municipal contractor for the manufacture of doors, windows
and other woodwork for a certain building. The contract
constitutes a mere purchase of material. Bohnen vs. Metz,
126 App. Div. 807, iiI N. Y. Supp. 196 (igo8)."
The Attorney General distinguishing the above case holds that
the eight-hour law is binding upon a contractor engaged in erecting
a school building even though he has some of the work, such as
the preparation and manufacture of fire escapes done in a factory
owned by him.

V
RIGHTS INVOLVED
(a) Of employer and employee.
See Atkins vs. Kansas,64 Kan. 174.
"A contractor, in bidding for work to be done by the
state, county or city or township, understands, in making
his estimates, that under the law eight hours per day is the
maximum time which his employees may work. He is in
no wise prejudiced, for all other bidders for the same work
have equal knowledge of the rule which the state has established governing the hours of labor to be performed in its
behalf." Re Dalton (Kans.), 47 L. R. A., p. 380.
(b) Waiver of rights by contract and conduct.
Similar legislation was upheld in Short vs. Bullion-Beck &
C. M. Co., 20 Utah 20, where it was held that the employee could
not waive his rights under the statute.
the oral or written contracts of the plaintiff to
work for ten hours each day for a stipulated weekly wage
were not contrary to law and were binding upon him. There
is nothing inconsistent with this in Atkins vs. Kansas which
"*

* *
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arose under a statute quite different in terms." (The particular ordinance is not given in the opinion so it is impossible
to determine wherein it differs from the Kansas statute.) Id.
"It frequently has been held that compensation for work
performed outside the time fixed by statute cannot be recovered when, without protest or demand at the time the
work is performed, regular wages have been accepted without comment." Id. Citing:
U. S. vs. Garlinger, 169 U. S. 316; Schurr vs. Savigny,
85 Mich. 144, 48 N. W. 547; Timmonds vs. U. S., 84 Fed.
933; Fitzgerald vs. InternationalPaper Co., 96 Me. 220, 52
Aft. 655; McCarthy vs. New York, 96 N. Y. i,48 Am. Rep.
6O1; Vogt. vs. Milwaukee, 99 Wis. 258; Luske vs. Hotchkiss,
37 Conn.219.
"The terms of employment are, by this statute, publicly
proclaimed; and, if a person insists upon working more than
eight hours a day, he must seek other employment. His
liberty of choice is not interfered with, nor his right to labor,
infringed." (Citing People ex rel. Warren vs. Beck, 30
N. Y. S. 473, and People vs. Warren, 28 N. Y. S. 303.) Re
Dalton (Kans.), 47 L. R. A. 380.
The statute cannot be evaded by calling compensation "salary"
and making it payable at long intervals.
State ex rel. vs. Ottawa (Kans.), 113 Pac. 391.
"We are of the opinion, therefore, that contracts, fixing
or giving a different length of time as a day's work are legal
and binding upon the parties making them." U. S. vs. Martin,
9 4U. S. 4oo.
Byrnes vs. City of New York, 15o App. Div. 338, presented
facts from which a waiver could be inferred, and was apparently
decided on that ground. Plaintiff, who was employed as a bricklayer in the fire department at a fixed annual salary of $939, had
receipted for it on the monthly payrolls, and had protested to the
deputies but not to the commissioner. He sued for the difference
between the amount he received and the prevailing rate, but was
not allowed to recover. The court said at page 340:
"The salary designated at the time of his employment was
an annual one, payable to him regardless of the amount of
work performed. Had he been employed at the prevailing
rate of wages, he would have been paid upon a per diem
basis for work actually performed. * * * Itwould seem
quite obvious that he chose the certainty of an annual salary,
payable regardless of the nature and amount of the work
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performed, in preference to the uncertainty of a higher por
diem wage, dependent upon the amount of time he was
actually engaged at work."
VI
INTERPRETATION
(a) Eight-hour clause.
The courts have held that the provisions of the section limiting
hours of labor upon the work of a municipality does not prevent
the employee from working overtime upon work of private customers of the contractor.
People ex rel. Hausauer-IonesPrinting Co. vs. Zimmerman, 58 Misc. 264.
(b) Prevailing wage.
The term "prevailing rate of wages" is interpreted to mean the
current, general or common rate for a legal day's work in the
same trade or occupation in the locality within the state where
such public work is performed in its final or completed form. The
phrase has been held constitutional in Ryan vs. City of New York;
177 N. Y. 271, 69 N. E. 579. See also Byrnes vs. City of New
York, 15o App. Div. 338.
"As to what the prevailing rate of wages is in this case in
dollars and cents," said Attorney General Carmody in an opinion
dated February 27, 1912, "is a question of fact to be determined
by the commissioner upon the evidence before him and is in no
way a question of law to be passed upon by the attorney general."
The term "prevailing rate of wages," he says in the same
opinion, "has had no authoritative judicial construction so far as
I have been able to find," and goes on to say: "'prevailing rate of
wages' must be interpreted to mean the prevailing, current, general or common rate paid for a legal day's work in the city of
Yonkers in the same trade or occupation. I do not think it necessarily means the highest or lowest wages paid but the average
or common rate-such a rate as one would be able to recover
in an action for services where no price was specified in the contract."
The intent, according to Mr. Justice Rumsey in McAvoy vs.
City of New York, 52 App. Div. 485, 490, "is to insure those
laborers the same amount of wages which it has been found
164
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necessary to pay to secure the services of other men at the same
sort of work, and to insure the payment to public laborers of the
same wages which other men in the same locality, at similar work,
are accustomed to receive."
In Ryan vs. City of New York, 177 N. Y. 271, the language
used on page 272 is:
"Work done for it (the state) or its several subdivisions
shall be paid for at such a rate as individuals and corporations in the same locality pay."
and page 275:
"It is provided that they shall be paid at a rate not less than
that paid by others for similar services in that locality."
The opinion of the Attorney General holds that "prevailing
rate" means "the rate paid for a legal day's work," that is,, for
eight hours. In New York it/has been said that this may be
doubted.
The labor law says merely "a day's work," and it would seem
that the rate taken should be that paid in outside employment for
the day's work customary in the locality, whether a seven, eight
or nine hour day.
VII
MANNER OF ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW
In Buffalo, New York, there are one or two cases a year ordinarily arising on complaint of some laborer or labor organization
that the provisions of the city contracts for an eight hour day
and the prevailing rate are violated. Ordinarily the contractor
assumes the burden of defense when any steps are taken to prevent the continuance of the work. When the city withholds pay
on a complaint that the contract has been violated, the contractor
assumes the burden of establishing compliance with the contract,
and the complainant is called upon by the city authorities to prove
the violation, and the matter is promptly settled by the court.
An employee who wishes to contest the correctness of a determination as to the prevailing rate of wages must do so when payment of wages is tendered. If he accepts the amount offered and
makes no protest he, in effect, accepts the correctness of the determination and waives all claim to a greater amount.
Ryan vs. City of New York, 177 N. Y. 271.
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In New York the rate of wages is fixed by Section 3 of the
Labor Law, which provides:
"The wages to be paid for a legal day's work, as hereinbefore defined, to all classes of such laborers, workmen or
mechanics upon all such public works, or upon any material
to be used upon or in connection therewith, shall not be less
than the prevailing rate for a day's work in the same trade
or occupation in the locality within the state where such
public work on, about or in connection with which such
labor is performed in its final or completed form is to be
situated, erected or used."
This section does not definitely fix the rates. It merely establishes the rule by which they must be fixed. Obviously, some one
must determine what the "prevailing rate of wages" is in any given
locality at any particular time.
In the case of Ryan vs. City of New York, 177 N. Y. 271, Chief
Justice Parker on page 278 pointed out that:
"Section 3 of the labor law does not attempt to fix in
dollars and cents the wages to be paid to those on state or
municipal work, but provides that such wages 'shall not be
less than the prevailing rate for a day's work in the same
trade or occupation in the locality.' The statute, therefore,
made it the duty of the person charged with employing
plaintiff to ascertain the prevailing rate of wages for similar
service in the city, and then to fix the compensation at that
amount or a still greater one."
Since the law declares that wages must be at the prevailing rate
and since nobody has been authorized to make a final, conclusive,
binding determination as to what is the rate prevailing in the
locality, it follows that in case of dispute the matter can be finally
settled only in the courts. That is, if the employee is dissatisfied
with the rate as provisionally fixed, he may protest, sue for the
amount he claims and have the matter determined in court according to the evidence produced. He cannot be bound by the determination of any municipal officer or body.
Walsh vs. City of Albany, 32 App. Div. 128, page 13o.
VIII
PENALTIES WHICH MAY BE IMPOSED
It has been held that for a violation of a statute providing that
a certain number of hours shall constitute a day's labor on public
166
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work, the legislature may provide that no officer shall be permitted
to pay the amount due on any contract, which has been performed
in violation of the statute, from funds under his official control.
People vs. Metz, supra.
The state has the right to pass a statute for the forfeiture of the
prohibited contract.
Atkins vs. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207; Ellis vs. U. S., 2o6 U. S.
246.
"As the legislature has power to regulate and fix the hours
of labor on public work, it has the incidental power to compel
obedience to its commands by mild or severe penalties, as it
sees fit. The method of enforcement is for it to determine.
It can make violation a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, or provide for a forfeiture of the contract,
or prohibit payment for work done thereunder. All this is
within its sound discretion. * * * the legislature * * *
now has the power * * * to provide that when that limit
is exceeded no officer of the state or municipal government
shall be permitted to pay therefor from funds under his
official control." People vs. Williams, etc., supra, page 2o7.
Ix
CONTRARY CASES DISTINGUISHED AND EXPLAINED
Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 20 Am. St. Rep. 226, was held
unconstitutional because in addition to providing for an 8-hour
day, it excluded Chinese from working on public works.
Seattle vs. S-Myth, 22 Wash. 327, 6o Pac. 112o, without argument simply holds that an 8-hour provision is unconstitutional on
the theory that they interfere with the constitutional right of
persons to contract with reference to compensation for their services, where such services are neither unlawful nor against public
policy. Later the court absolutely refused to follow the case and
held a similar measure to be a valid exercise of power.
In Street vs. Tarney ElectricalSupply Co. (Ind.), 61 L. R. A.
154, the court held invalid a measure fixing the minimum wage
for unskilled workers at $2 a day, saying:
"But no legal and sufficient reason can be assigned for
placing unskilled labor in a class by itself for the purpose
of fixing by law the minimum wage at which it shall be
employed by counties, cities, and towns on their public work.
Why exclude the skilled mechanic from the benefit of the
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act? Why compel the payment of a higher rate of wages
to the unskilled laborer than may be demanded by the
skilled mechanic for more difficult and important work, requiring special training, experience, and a higher degree of
intelligence. * * * No sufficient reason has been assigned
why the wages of the unskilled laborer should be fixed by
law and maintained at an unalterable rate, regardless of their
actual value, and that all other laborers should be left to
secure to themselves such compensation for their work as
the conditions of supply and demand, competition, personal
qualities, energy, skill and experience may enable them to do."
In speaking of cases which held invalid statutes imposing an
8-hour day on all contracts let by cities, the court in Keefe vs.
People (Colo.), 87 Pac. 791, said:
"These authorities are based upon the proposition that,
with respect to the carrying on of works of improvements by
municipal corporations, they are free from legislative restraint by statutes of this character as are private corporations in carrying out the objects of their incorporation; and,
since private corporations may not thus be controlled, it
follows that municipal corporations cannot be; that a municipal corporation, in exercising that branch of its powers
may properly be designated as "private" concerning its purely
private rights, are, like private corporations, free from such
contror of the legislative department of government."
The cases on which it places this interpretation follow:
Cleveland vs. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 67 Ohio St. 197,
59 L. R. A. 775, 65 N. E. 885; Ex ParteKubach, 85 Cal. 274,
9 L. R. A. 482, 20 Am. St. Rep. 226, 24 Pac. 737; Seattle vs.
Smyth, 22 Wash. 327, 79 Am. St. Rep. 939, 6o Pac. 112o;

People vs. Orange County Road Constr. Co., 37 Misc. 341,
75 N. Y. S. 510, 175 N. Y. 84,65 L. R. A. 33,67 N. E. 129;
People ex rel. Rodgers vs. Coler, 166 N. Y. I, 52 L. R. A.
814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N. E. 716; Fiske vs. People,
I88 Ill. 206; 58 N. E. 985; 52 L. R. A. 291.

